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CASE COMMENTS

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: McCULLOCH DOCTRINE
SUMMARILY REAFFIRMED
First AgriculturalNational Bank of Berkshire County v. State
Tax Commission, 88 S.Ct. 2173 (1968)
Plaintiff, a national bank, paid state sales and use taxes to the vendors of
tangible personal property purchased for business use. Prior to paying the
taxes, plaintiff requested the defendant commission to rule that it was
exempt from payment. No ruling was given. After the taxes were paid,
defendant issued an emergency regulation declaring that the bank was subject
to the tax. Plaintiff then sought a binding declaration in the matter. The
trial court reserved decision for the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
which held that a national bank is not exempt from such taxes under the
Massachusetts statute.1 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court HELD,
states are without power, unless authorized by Congress, to tax national
2
banks.
The instant case represents the most recent in a long line of Supreme
Court decisions reaffirming the principle of McCulloch v. Maryland.3 In
McCulloch, the Court held unconstitutional a state tax on notes issued by
banks not chartered by the state legislature.4 Chief Justice Marshall warned
in his opinion that "the power to tax involves the power to destroy."5 Five
years later in 1824, the Court struck down a similar state tax on a federal bank
in Osborn v. Bank of the United States.6
In 1864, in order to abate possible misunderstandings between the states
and the national banks, Congress passed legislation clearly delineating the
states' power to tax. 7 During the debate on the statute the implied governmental tax immunity created by McCulloch was staunchly promoted by
Senator Sumner, a leading opponent of any state taxation of national banks.8
Even during this period, some members of the House were strongly in favor
of broader state and municipal taxing power over these institutions. 9 Due
1. 353 Mass. 172, 229 N.E.2d 245 (1967).
2. 88 S. Ct. 2173 (1968).
S. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436 (1819) stated "[t]he court has bestowed on this subject
its most deliberate consideration. The result is a conviction that the States have no power,
by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers
vested in the general government."
4. Id.
5. Id. at 431.
6. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). The tax was levied against "... all banks, and individuals, and companies ... that may transact banking business in this State, without being
allowed to do so by the laws thereof." Id. at 740. The Bank of the United States was
recited in the act.
7. Act of June 3,ch. 106, §41, 13 Stat. 111 (1864) (now 12 U.S.C. §548 (1964)).
8. CoNG. GLOB, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1893-94 (1864).
9. The following is part of the House debate: Mr. Tracy (Pa.): "I hope it is not
proposed that all this great interest [national banks] shall be released from taxation within
the States." Mr. Eldredge: ". . . [t]he proposition of this bill, to drive all the banking
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to this conflict, a compromise bill was worked out that granted states a
limited power to tax. 10
During the next hundred years myriad decisions came down from the
Supreme Court interpreting and upholding the statute., In each case the
Court adhered to its determination that a state could not tax national banks,
their property, or their capital stock except as authorized by Congress.
In the present case Justice Black, writing the majority opinion, unfortunately felt it unnecessary to reach the constitutional issue as to whether
national banks are still entitled to tax immunity as governmental agencies.12
The Court expressed the opinion that they could take no action in this field
because of congressional preemption under article 1.13 Justice Thurgood
Marshall, dissenting, reasoned that enough time had elapsed since the creation
14
of a dual banking system to warrant reappraisal of the McCulloch Doctrine.
When Chief Justice Marshall enunciated his doctrine of governmental
tax immunity, he was speaking with reference to a state tax affecting the
operations of a fledgling federal government trying to stabilize its finances.
In that case, the tax was placed directly on an institution partially owned and
operated by the federal government. Subsequent developments in the banking
system and the Government's role in it strongly suggest a need to reconsider
the McCulloch rationale.
Governmental tax immunity evolved when very little of the national
wealth went to pay taxes of any kind. Of the large part of the national
income presently going to pay taxes, the federal government collects almost
three-fourths of the revenue, leaving the states severly hamperd in their

capital of the country into organization under this national banking system, and then to
relieve it all from taxation, is a perfectly monstrous and outrageous proposition." Mr.
Morrill: "I submit that these banks are to be taxed, and taxed fully, and it is a fallacy
to argue here that they are to go exempt." CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1392 (1864).
10. Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, §41, 13 Stat. 111 (1864) (now 12 U.S.C. §548 (1964)).
11. Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239 (1931) (tax on stock); First
Nat'l Bank v. City of Hartford, 273 U.S. 548 (1927) (tax on stock); Des Moines Nat'l Bank
v. Fairweather, 263 U.S. 103 (1923) (tax on stock); Bank of Cal. Nat'l Ass'n v. Richardson,
248 U.S. 476 (1919) (tax on stock); Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U.S. 664
(1899) (tax on franchise); Davis v. Elmira Sav. Bank, 161 U.S. 275 (1896) (conflicting state
statute).
12. 88 S. Ct. 2173 (1968).
13. Id. In an earlier case the Court held that Congress has the power to protect the
instrumentalities it has constitutionally created, which follows naturally from the express
grant of power to Congress "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into execution all powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the
United States CONsT. Art. I, §8, par. 18." Federal Land Bank v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314
U.S. 95, 1102-03 (1941) quoting Pittman v. Home Owners' Loan Corp., 308 U.S. 21, 33
(1939). The Court exercised further restraint because as Justice Brandeis postulated: "[t]he
Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the
record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed
of. . . . Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court
will decide only the latter." Ashwander v. T.V.A., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936).
14. 88 S.Ct. at 2178 (dissenting opinion).
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efforts to fill their monetary needs.15 This situation is worsened by the tax
immunity that certain organizations claim- including the national banks.
Of very recent significance to the national and state banks doing business
in Florida is the Supreme Court affirmation of the lower court in First
National Bank of Homestead v. Dickinson.16 The district court citing the
instant case as controlling authority, held that the state of Florida was enjoined from collecting (a) sales and use taxes from plaintiff, (b) intangible
personal property taxes on mortgages held by plaintiff, and (c) documentary
stamp taxes on notes, mortgages, or other evidences of debt held by the bank
or on shares of stock and capital debentures issued by the plaintiff.17 This
decision becomes particularly notable in light of a Florida statute that grants
state banks the same immunity from state and local taxation that national
banks are entitled to under federal statutes.' s Under the terms of this statute
any state taxes paid by state banks, but not required of national banks, must
be refunded. Following the holding in the present case, the state sales taxes
paid by more than 500 Florida state chartered banks must be returned.19
The national banks of today are considerably removed from the Second
National Bank of the United States preserved by McCulloch. As a practical
matter, the national banks are privately owned corporations 20 performing no
essential functions not discharged by either state banks or federal reserve
banks. The competitive ability of national banks is not hindered by raising
the taxation imposed upon them to the level of their state counterparts.
In People of the State of New York v. Weaver, the Court implied it would
uphold a personal property tax on national bank shares as long as the tax
was not greater than taxes on other corporate securities in the state. 21 More
recently, the Court noted that "in determining the burden of the tax -its
discriminatory character - we look to its effect, not its rate." 22 Presently,
certain national banks continue to pay state sales taxes rather than object and
risk the possibility of having other allowable state taxes raised. 23 As a
practical matter, these banks have continued in effective competition with
their state rivals.
In the present case, the state statute was held by the highest state court
to be placed on the vendor.2 4 The Supreme Court did not accept this reason-

15. Pierce, Tax Immunity Should Not Mean Tax Inequity, 1959 Wis. L. REv. 173 n.2
(1959). But see Powell, The Waning of Intergovernmental Tax Immunities, 58 HARv. L. Rnv.,
633 (1945).
16. 291 F. Supp. 855 (N.D. Fla. 1968), aff'd, 37 U.S.L.W. 3267 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1969) (No.

741).
17. Id.
18. FA. STAT. §192.54 (1967).
19. St. Petersburg (Fla.) Times, Dec. 15, 1968, §B, at 1, col. 5.

20. 12 U.s.. §35 (1964).
21. 100 U.S. 539, 545 (1879).
22. Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Michigan, 365 U.S. 467, 475 (1961).
23. Lehr, Two Aspects of Federal State Relations: State Taxation of National Banks
and Proposed Federal Supervision of Foreign Banking, 84 BANKING L.J. 941, 942 (1967).
24. 353 Mass. 172, 229 N.E.2d 245 (1967).
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ing.2 5 Instead the Court interpreted the tax as being placed on the vendee,

completely contrary to the wording of the statute..2 6 However, on whom the
tax falls is unimportant in light of the fact that both state and national
institutions paid the tax. There was no discriminatory tax levied on the
national banks; they were not taxed to any greater degree than were any
other private corporations doing business in the state. The Court has previously held that a tax should be declared unconstitutional only when the tax
is economically burdensome on the national government.2 7 Under the tax
in the instant case, there is no burden imposed on the national government
since the banks are, in reality, no longer governmental agencies. Even
assuming that the national banks are vital governmental agencies, the Court
has declared that the test as to the unconstitutionality of a tax on a federal
instrumentality should be "whether it hinders or embarrasses the instrumentality in the performance of important governmental functions." 2 The
Court failed to apply this test in the present case. It refused to recognize
that national banks perform no important governmental task. Unlike the
national banks, the twelve Federal Reserve Banks perform significant governmental functions and can be designated as fiscal agents of the federal
government. 29 Thus, Congress is certainly justified in exempting the latter
from state taxation. so
In failing to decide the constitutional issue, Justice Black assumed that
any changes in banking legislation must necessarily come from Congress,
which "has been far from reluctant to pass legislation in the banking field."3
The Justice cites the National Banking Act of 1864 as evidence of this fact.
However, no significant legislation has been enacted in the period since the
act came into existence. Only recently the Court noted that since the act was
promulgated more than fifty-five cases regarding the act had come before it
and, during this period, the Court has continued to interpret the provisions of
the act as prohibiting only taxes that discriminate in particular against the
operation of national banks.32 Moreover, in Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe
the Court warned that congressional silence should not be interpreted as
implying immunity from taxation where no grounds for immunity appear
from congressional action. 3 3 Another ground for the contention that national
banks are no longer entitled to tax immunity is their essential similarity to
state banks. Both are created by statute. The only real modern distinction of
any significance is the fact that one is subject to federal supervision and the
25. 88 S. Ct. at 2177.
26. MAss. GEN. LAWS
27.

ANN.

ch. 64H, §3 (1967 Supp.).

Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 481 (1939).

28. Federal Land Bank v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 102 (1941).
29. 12 U.S.C. §391 (1964). The Federal Reserve Board, appointed by the President of
the United States, supervises the issue and retirement of Federal Reserve notes, examines
Federal Reserve banks and member banks and exercises general supervisory authority over
Federal Reserve banks 12 U.S.C. §248 (a), (d), (j) (1964).

30. 12 U.S.C. §531 (1964).
31. 88 S. Ct. at 2175.
32. National Bank v. Michigan, 365 U.S. 467, 472-73 (1961).
33. 306 U.S. 466, 480 (1939).
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